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Growing evidence of surface-water and ground-
water contamination has led to demands for federal
and state water quality protection policies. Agr-
iculturewill be an important target of such policies.
Numerous instances of surface-water and ground-
water contamination by pesticides and fertilizers
have been recorded, and one study estimates that
the drinking water of 50 million people in the U.S.
is potentially contaminated by agricultural chemi-
cals (Hallberg, Nielsen and Lee).
A number of policy approaches for reducing ag-
ricultural impacts on water quality are being dis-
cussed or implemented. These include extending
the cross-compliance provisions of the 1985 and
1990 Farm Bills to include water quality protec-
tion, prohibitions on the use of certain chemicals
(e.g., Proposition 128 in California), incentive
payments for water quality protection schemes in
the 1990 Farm Bill, and research and development
on “low-input” production methods. In this paper
we outline several of these approaches. We con-
sider general approaches rather than specific pro-
posals so that the outline is framed in broad terms.
We also present economic and political criteria for
evaluating the policy options and some tentative
rankings.
Evaluation Criteria
In this section we present economic and political
criteria for evaluation of the policy options. Clearly,
no one policy approach will dominate all criteria.
Indeed, there can be significant trade-offs. For ex-
ample, a Draconian measure, like banning all pes-
ticides, would be very effective, but the economic
costs and political fallout would be enormous. Gen-
eralizations about how different approaches com-
pare on different criteria must be made cautiously
because it is often the specific features of an ap-
proach that determine its performance, However,
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any good policy should be politically viable while
avoiding unneceswuyharm to economic well-being.
Economic Ejjiciency and Fairness
Economic criteria for evaluating alternative policy
options include (1) the benefits of achieving water
quality protection goals; (2) costs of adjustments
in agricultural production practices; (3) costs of
administration and enforcement; (4) incentives
created for the development and adoption of less-
polluting production methods, shifts to products
which are less intensive in polluting inputs, and
reallocation of production away from environmen-
tally sensitive areas; and (5) distribution of the costs
among different groups. These criteria follow from
the efficiency/fairness paradigm of modem welfare
economics and are developed in a much broader
form elsewhere (e.g., Bohm and Russell).
The economic benefits of water quality protec-
tion in an area depend on the effectiveness of the
protection program and the economic value of sur-
face water and groundwater in various uses. Pro-
grams that would have comparable effects on water
quality would have comparable benefits. In com-
paring alternative programs in this analysis, we will
usually assume that the alternatives can yield com-
parable benefits. When this assumption holds, the
economic efficiency of a program is measured by
its cost-effectiveness.
Changes in fertilization, pest management, and
other practices to reduce surface-water and ground-
water contaminants will generally increase pro-
duction costs. Other things being equal, a policy
that allows lower cost control is economically pre-
ferred to one that is more costly. The costs of
agricultural production adjustments in achieving
water quality protection will depend on the costs
of changes in production practices on individual
farms and the allocation of control among farms.
Variations between farms in productivity and the
physical determinants of water pollution mean that
some farmers may be able to take actions to protect
water quality at a lower cost than others. Programs
that allocate greater reductions in pollution to farms54 April 1991 NJARE
with low cleanup costs relative to farms with high
cleanup costs are desirable.
Administration and enforcement costs are related
to a variety of factors, some of which depend on
the characteristics of the program being considered,
others that depend on the agency charged with en-
forcement efforts, and still others that relate to the
legal system. The Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA) monitoring and enforcement efforts in the
air and point-source water pollution areas illustrate
the difficulties that can occur (Russell). The tech-
nological complexities of monitoring and enforce-
ment, underfunding of EPA efforts, and legal
wrangling have led to half-hearted enforcement and
widespread violations. While these problems do
not preclude effective action, they increase the cost
of achieving any given level of enforcement.
In the area of water quality protection, problems
would be even worse if U,S, Department of
Agriculture (USDA) agencies were responsible
for enforcement. There are strong pressures on
county-based USDA personnel to be lenient with
farmers, as evidenced by enforcement of the en-
vironmental provisions of the 1985 Farm Bill (Ro-
senthal). Problems might also be worse if a program
were administered at the statehcal level rather than
the federal level. States have historically been very
reluctant to do anything that would reduce their
commercial competitiveness (although the recent
“green” propositions in California area major de-
viation from this norm).
Political Viability
The key political criteria for evaluating water qual-
ity protection policies are (1) the effect of each
policy on the influential political interest groups
with a large stake (one way or another) in the pol-
icy; (2) impacts on federal, state, and/or local gov-
ernment budgets; and (3) administration and
enforcement costs. Political viability is clearly not
independent of economic efficiency and fairness,
since policies that scorepoorly on economic grounds
are likely to be politically doubtful. Budgetary im-
pacts and administration/enforcement costs are also
key economic criteria. However, political viability
is not identical to economic considerations. The
interests of groups with more political clout will
be weighted more heavily in designing water qual-
ity protection policies.
It is useful to think in terms of a revealed political
preference function that is a weighted sum of wel-
fare measures for various groups. A simple pref-
erence function would include consumer surplus,
producer surplus, net government revenue, and en-
vironmental losses. When the weightson these items
are the same, we have a simple social welfare func-
tion. In this case, maximizing the preference func-
tion with respect to a pollution-control policy and
subject to the constraint that environmental dam-
ages are limited to some level yields the economic
criteria outlined above. When the weights differ
(e.g., producer surplus is weighted more heavily
than consumer surplus), solving this maximization
problem yields the political criteria discussed here.
This revealed political preference approach is de-
veloped more fully and formally elsewhere (e.g.,
Gardner).
Farm organizations are the most important of the
influentialpolitical intemt groups with a large stake
in groundwater policies for agriculture. Among farm
organizations, there is agreement that the com-
modity-specific groups, like the National Associ-
ation of Wheat Growers, wield the most power
(Browne). These groups have clout because of their
relatively small size and homogeneousmember in-
terests. In politics, size is generally a disadvantage
because the incentives for group members to “free
ride” on the lobbying activities of their fellow
members grow as group size grows.
In determining the impact of each policy on
the farm commodity groups, it is necessary to
determine how existing farmland owners would
be affected. It is generally recognized that farm
organizations act mainly as representatives for this
group. Some of the policies discussed below would
have the effect of discouraging entry by new farm-
ers or otherwise raising production costs for new
farmers relative to established farmers. In so doing,
they would give existing farmers a competitive ad-
vantage. If the competitive advantage were large
enough, the farm groups might actually lobby in
favor of policies that at first glance appear contrary
to their interests. Some of the policies would also
have the effect of raising farmland values, which
would reduce opposition or increase support by the
farm groups.
The experience under the Clean Air Act is es-
pecially relevant here. One important effect of this
act has been to retard the growth of new industry
in the southern and western parts of the country
(Pashigian). EPA regulations require new plants to
meet tighter standards than old ones. In addition,
plants in areas of the country that are cleaner than
national standards must meet tighter standards than
plants in areas with poor air quality. This has given
older industry in the Northeast a large competitive
advantage. Indeed, this competitive advantage more
than offsets the direct costs of the Clean Air Act
to industry in the Northeast (Bartel and Thomas).
Environmental groups also have both significant
political clout and an important stake in water qual-Abler and Shor(le
ity policies. These groups have clout for the same
reasons as the farm groups—a relatively small
number of active, “core” members (although many
have long lists of contributors) and relatively ho-
mogeneousmember interests. Groups like the Na-
tional Audubon Society and the National Wildlife
Federation are very active in farm policy (Browne).
The 1985 Farm Bill was significantly influenced
by environmental interests, and their influence
has been even greater in the drafting of the 1990
Farm Bill, However, given the assumption that the
programs being examined yield comparable envi-
ronmental benefits, the environmental groups pre-
sumably would give each one equal support. The
relative political merits of each program then turn
on effects on other groups.
Chemical input suppliers are politically impor-
tant and would seem to have a strong incentive to
oppose groundwater policies that reduce the use of
chemical inputs. Indeed, organizations like the Fer-
tilizer Institute and the National Agricultural
Chemicals Association do lobby in Washington.
However, their stake in these policies is limited.
This is because, in the long run, resources devoted
to the production of agricultural chemicals can be
shifted at relatively low cost to the production of
chemicals for other sectors (Gardner).
Impacts on federal, state, and/or local gover-
nmentbudgets are politically important because of
competition among interest groups for government
funds. Some of the policies (e.g., subsidies to
farmers) could potentially involve huge expendi-
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tures. Conversely, a tax on chemical inputs would
raise funds that could be spent on other programs.
In an era of large federal budget deficits and a
multitude of claimants on federal dollars, large new
federal expenditures on water quality production
are politically doubtful. Budgetary pressures are
also intense at the state and local levels.
Depending on how a policy is implemented, ad-
ministration and enforcement costs will be borne
primarily by farmers or primarily by the gover-
nment.If the costs are small, this is unimportant.
However, if the costs are large and borne primarily
by farmers, their opposition could easily doom the
proposed policy. If the costs are large and borne
primarily by the government, competing pressures
on government funds would make the policy po-
litically doubtful. The conclusion is that a policy
is economically and politically questionable if the
costs of administration and enforcement are large.
Policy Options and Their Merits
A list of groundwater protection methods is found
in Table 1. The list is classified into five types of
methods: moral suasion, design standards, perfor-
mance standards, economic incentives, and re-
searchand development. For each method, examples
are provided. Each of the policies listed has either
been proposed or tried at the federal, state, and/or
local level. This is an important fact to keep in
mind when considering economic and political vi-
Table 1. Policy Evaluations
Potential Cost-Effectiveness Administration & Farmland-
Effective- Farm- Allo- Incentive Enforcement Budgetary Owner
Political Options ness Level cativea Effects costs Impactsb Impactsc
Moral suasion
Direct regulations
Limits on chemical
input use
Enterprise-Choice
regulations
Performance standards
Economic incentives
Taxes on chemical inputs
Subsidies for reduced
chemical-input use
Taxes on chemicrd loss
Subsidies for reduced
chemical losses
Conservation compliance
Research & develo!Jment
Poor
d d Poor Low Small (–)
d
Good Poor Good Medium Small (–) Good
Good Poor Poor Poor Medium/High Medium/High ( – ) Good
Good Good Poor Good High Large ( – ) Good
Good
Good
Fair/Good
Fair/Good
Fair/Good
Fair/Good
Good
Fair/Good
Medium
Medium
(+)
Large (–)
Poor
Good
Good
Good
Good
Good
Good
Good
Good
Good
High
High
(+)
Large (–)
Poor
Good
Good
Poor
Poor
d
Poor
d
Good
Good
Medium
Low
Large ( + )
(–)
Poor
d
‘Allocative cost-effectiveness pertains to the ability of a policy to allocate pollution control among farms in a least-cost way.
~his category is a combined assessment of all budgekwy impacts, including administration and enforcement costs,
CThis category refers to impacts on farmland prices.
‘Good if there is any impact on chemical losses.56 April 1991 NJARE
ability since it means that each policy has at least
some degree of acceptability. Missing from the list
are alternatives that are either prohibitively expen-
sive or politically naive.
Moral Suasion and Education
One approach to water quality protection is moral
suasion combined with education. The premise of
this approach, which 1swidely discussed and im-
plemented in many states in varying degrees, is
that farmers will voluntarily adopt pollution control
practices if they are informed of the possible inef-
ficiency of their current use of pesticides or fertil-
izers, and their own risk and social responsibility,
educated on what they can do to help reduce the
problem, and given some technical assistance in
implementing the pollution control practices,
Voluntary programs have excellent short-run po-
litical appeal. Politicians can appeal to the virtues
of a clean environment, safe drinking water, and
other desirable goals without having to do any-
thing. Indeed, moral suasion has a long political
history. However, the long-run political viability
of moral suasion is only fair because it is unlikely
to be effective in satisfying the public demand for
water quality protection.
Agricultural markets are competitive and pres-
sures on producers are increasing as markets be-
come increasinglynationaland internationalin scope.
At the same time, reducing government support of
farmers and further liberalization of trade are on
the national agenda, It is unrealistic to believe that
the average farmer will adopt costly pollution con-
trol measures under these circumstances (Bohm and
Russell).
Of course, farmers may take some voluntary ac-
tion to protect water quality if only to protect their
own water supplies, but it would be unwise to rely
on self-protection as public policy. First, levels of
protection would be based on individual farmers’
perceptions of health effects and standards of safety
rather than societal standards. Second, many farm-
ers may find it cheaper to find alternative sources
of water or to treat their existing supplies than to
change production practices.
Some farmers may also voluntarily cut back on
chemical use to improve profits. There is wide-
spread belief that farmers use more fertilizer and
pesticides than needed to maximize profits. If true,
there may be some gains from education. However,
alternative explanations of what appears to be ir-
rational behavior may exist. For example, risk-
averse farmers uncertain about pest hazards may
prefer to reduce expected profit by applying pes-
ticides in exchange for reducing the risk that profits
will fall below some minimum level. Moreover,
reductions in chemical use motivated by profits
may not yield sufficient reductions to achieve water
quality goals. Again, farmers’ individual goals, even
when pursued with full information, may not cor-
respond to societal goals.
Our conclusion is that moral suasion cannot be
relied on to protect water quality. It can help, but
real progress will require regulatory measures or
significant economic incentives.
Design Standards
Direct regulation through design standards is the
traditional method of pollution control in the U.S.
Design standards for agricultural sources involve
regulations pertaining to the ways farmers produce
and manage their land. For example, to reduce
nutrient losses, regulations could be imposed on
the levels, timing, and forms of nutrient applica-
tions to cropland, and barnyard waste management
practices. Similarly, pesticide losses can be con-
trolled by regulations on the level, timing, and
forms of pesticide applications. Another type of
design standard would be a restriction on land use
in critical recharge areas.
The potential performance of alternative policy
approaches in achieving least-cost control at the
farm level depends on information available to
farmers as opposed to public planners. If they have
equal information or if the public sector has better
information about the costs of changes in pro-
duction needed to meet water quality goals, then
design standards make considerable sense for cost-
effective control. Public planners could give each
farm a plan that maximizes its profits subject to
the water quality goals being satisfied. However,
the more likely case is that farmers have specialized
information that they could use to figure out cheaper
ways of achieving these goals than public planners,
provided that farmers are informed about the rel-
evant effects of different management practices.
Design standards, therefore, rate poorly in terms
of their ability to promote cost-effective control.
The ability of different types of programs to al-
locate pollution control among different farms in
a least-cost manner is also dependent upon infor-
mation available to the public planner. If the public
planner has perfect information about the econom-
ics of specific farms and the physical environment,
then the planner can, in principle, construct reg-
ulatory or incentive programs that will induce each
farmer to choose the optimal course of action.
However, planners have highly imperfect infor-
mation about costs and getting information can be
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sidered to perform poorly in allocating pollution
control among sources in a least-cost manner. The
regulator, with little information about individual
costs. cannot set standards that correspond to the
relative costs of control.
Design standards have advantages from the per-
spective of administrative and enforcement costs.
Planners can choose easily observed designs, like
bans on certain pesticides, land-use restrictions, or
requirements that animal manures be stored in cer-
tain types of facilities in order to achieve substantial
reductions in the application and percolation of pol-
luting inputs. There is no need to monitor or es-
timate pollution flows or determine the level of
incentives needed to achieve desired results, On
the other hand, past problems in enforcing envi-
ronmental laws that impose restrictions on individ-
ual firms argue against any proposal that requires
one to observe farm-level behavior.
Finally, design standards must be ranked poorly
with respect to incentive effects. Unless new and
potentially more profitable designs can be easily
tested and registered for use, design standards do
not allow for improved profits with improved per-
formance.
The politicalviabilityof design standardsisclearly
dependent on the economic considerations dis-
cussed above. However, the effect of these stan-
dards on existing farmland owners is also critical,
Suppose that the standards significantly increase
farm production costs without leading to higher
farm product prices, an increase in the demand for
farml&d, or a competitive advantage for existing
farmers over new farmers. In this case, opposition
from the farm groups argues against political via-
bility, Their opposition would not be so large if
higher production costs were borne in part by con-
sumers in the form of higher food prices. From an
economic perspective, this is not important since
it merely reallocates these costs. From a political
perspective, however, this shifts the burden from
those with substantial political clout (farmers) to
those with much less influence (consumers).
Opposition by existing farmland owners would
also be reduced if the design standards increased
the demand for farmland. Consider a restriction on
chemical input use. If the increase in the demand
for land were large enough, some landowners would
actually lobby for this policy. As an approxima-
tion, landowners gain in aggregate from restrictions
on chemical inputs if the elasticity of substitution
between chemical inputs and land exceeds the price
elasticity of demand for farm products (Gardner).
Simulations for the U.S. indicate that restrictions
on chemicals on the major cash grains would in
fact increase land rents (Abler and Shortle). Of
course, landowners in chemical-intensive regions
may lose relative to those in less chemical-intensive
regions.
In addition, opposition would be reduced if the
design standards were written and enforced so as
to favor existing farmers over new farmers. Exist-
ing farmers could be favored in many ways. For
example, zoning or enterprise-choice regulations
could contain grandfather clauses that exempt ex-
isting farms. Restrictions on chemical input use
could be applied more stringently to new farms.
Experience under the Clean Air Act suggests that
design standards would be written and enforced in
this way. Given that economic costs are not too
great, then the political viability of design stan-
dards is rated as good.
Performance Standards
An alternative to design standards is performance
standards, which involve regulations pertaining to
an observable outcome of the polluter’s decisions,
such as chemical residues in groundwater. Emis-
sions-based standards are not practical for agricul-
tural control because the pollution contributions of
individual farms are unobservable for all practical
purposes. However, models for estimating chem-
ical losses that utilize information on farm man-
agement practices, weather, soil characteristics, and
other relevant factors have been developed. They
can be used to evaluate technologies for managing
nonpoint pollution and to diminish the uncertainty
associated with the monitoring problem (Decour-
sey). Estimates obtained from such models could
also be used as a measure of performance (Bar-
rington, Krupnick, and Peskin; Shortle and Dunn).
Therefore, rather than limiting farm chemical ap-
plications, limits could be imposed on chemical
losses as determined by an accepted formula.
Performance standards are ranked highly with
respect to least-cost control because farmers have
an incentive to use their specialized information to
minimize costs. Similarly, performance standards
are ranked well with respect to incentive effects
since they give farmers the ability and interest in
adopting lower-cost methods of pollution control.
On the other hand, given imperfect information
about the costs of control facing different produc-
ers, performance standards must be ranked poorly
with respect to their ability to allocatecontrol among
farms in a least-cost way. Performance standards
require observations of farming practices to mon-
itor and enforce compliance. The complexity of
this may be substantial and, as discussed above,
diligent enforcement simply may never occur.
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in favor of design standards also apply to perfor-
mance standards. Limits on estimated chemical
losses would reduce the use of chemical inputs to
at least some extent. This would raise the demand
for farmland, benefiting existing farmland owners.
In addition, the standards would probably be writ-
ten and enforced so as to benefit existing farmers
at the expense of new farmers. However, the com-
plexity of the standards would result in high ad-
ministration and enforcement costs. Just as this
complexity reduces economic viability, it reduces
political viability. Therefore, the political viability
of performance standards is rated as fair.
Economic Incentives
As with direct regulation, economic incentives can
be applied to farmers’ actions or to outcomes of
their actions. For example, to diminish nitrogen or
pesticide losses, taxes could be imposed on nitro-
gen and pesticide applications or to an estimate of
chemical losses provided by an accepted formula.
Conversely, subsidies could be given for reductions
in chemical use or chemical loss relative to some
benchmark. Subsidies could also be used to help
defray some portion of the cost of soil testing,
scouting, and other services. Cost-sharing subsi-
dies for conservation practices are a long-standing
feature of agricultural policy. The 1990 farm bill
continues this tradition by offering incentive pay-
ments to farmers who adopt water quality protec-
tion measures. Incentives that apply to pollution
control performance are referred to here as perfor-
mance incentives, while those based on design fac-
tors, such as polluting inputs, are called design
incentives.
An important current example of design incen-
tive is cross-compliance. Under the 1985 and 1990
Farm Bills, farmers with highly erodible land are
required to develop and implement farm plans to
meet conservation performance standards if they
are to remain eligible for USDA commodity pro-
gram benefits. There are calls for extending these
eligibility criteria to include water quality protec-
tion measures, Another incentive approach with
interesting possibilities is marketable permits
granting farmers rights to chemical use and/or loss.
Control of the total supply of permits in a region
would give government the ability to control the
total application or loss of chemicals, while the
market for the permits would determine the allo-
cation of use or loss among farms.
When faced with taxes, subsidies, or other in-
centives, farmers will compare the gains in terms
of reduced taxes or increased subsidies for pollu-
tion control to the costs of adopting pollution prac-
tices. Their incentive will be to increase the subsidy
base or reduce the tax base as long as it isprofitable.
If the tax base is chemical loss or the subsidy base
is reduced chemical loss, then least-cost control is
achieved. Accordingly, performance incentives in-
duce least-cost control at the farm level. If the tax
base is closely correlated with chemical loss or the
subsidy base is closely correlated to the reduction
in chemical loss (e.g., nitrogen application rates),
least-cost control will not generally be achieved
but may be closely approximated. Hence, design
incentives may be constructed to perform relatively
well in promoting least-cost control when the tax
or subsidy base(s) are closely correlated to pollu-
tion control performance.
Performance and design incentives also have rel-
atively desirable properties with respect to allo-
cating pollution control among alternative sources.
Low-cost abaters are those who will suffer a smaller
loss or realize a larger profit from adopting pol-
lution control practices. Accordingly, low-cost
abaters will exercise more control than high-cost
abaters when faced with uniform incentives.
The costs of administering and enforcing per-
formance incentives should not differ much from
the costs of administering and enforcing perfor-
mance standards in a relatively static economic en-
vironment. Depending on their complexity, design
incentives may be as costly to administer and en-
force as performance incentives and standards or
approximate the cost of simple design standards.
However, unlike performance or design standards,
programs involving the use of economic incentives
may need periodic revision in response to changes
in the economic environment in order to maintain
their effectiveness. This clearly increases their ad-
ministration costs in a rapidly changing economic
environment. A case in point would be extension
of the cross-compliance approach mentioned above.
A farm’s decision to participate in a commodity
program is not based on the social costs of water
pollution caused by its activities. Rather, it is based
on the net gain to the farmer from participation.
During periods of high market prices, farmers have
strong incentives to apply more fertilizer, pesti-
cides, and other chemical inputs to each acre in
order to raise yields. During these periods, then,
the incentives to engage in environmentally dam-
aging activities are greatest. Yet it is precisely dur-
ing periods of high prices that the incentives to
participate in the commodity programs are lowest.
During the farm price boom of the mid- 1970s, for
example, market prices for wheat and feed grains
were well in excess of loan rates. As a result,
participation in the programs for these crops was
negligible.Abler and Shorde The Political Economy of Water Quality Protection 59
An important aspect of performance incentives
is that they will induce research and development
to discover less environmentally harmful practices.
The incentive for innovation increases as the rel-
ative profitability of alternative practices increases.
Taxes or fees will give incentives to find methods
of production which are both lower in cost and iess
polluting, as will subsidies for improved perfor-
mance. Indeed, there is probably no more effective
way in the long run to reduce chemical use than
to impose economic penalties. The penalties would
induce technical innovation to facilitate substitu-
tion of other resources for chemicals and shifts in
crop mix toward those crops that are less chemical-
intensive. In addition, if regions intensive in chem-
ical use were also those at greatest environmental
risk, the penalties would induce shifts in production
to regions where chemical use poses less of an
environmental problem.
The political implications of economic incen-
tives vary considerably, depending on the type of
incentive studied. Subsidies for cutbacks on chem-
ical input use or chemical losses would benefit ex-
isting farmland owners. They would benefit both
from the subsidy directly and from the increase in
demand for farmland caused by reductions in
chemical-input use. If conservation compliance were
applied mainly to new farmers, existing farmland
owners would gain. However, they would probably
lose if it were applied equally to all farms. Sim-
ulations indicate that the net gain to farmers from
participation in the farm commodity programs, given
cross-compliance, can be small or even negative
(McSweeny and Kramer).
The effects of taxes on chemical inputs or esti-
mated chemical 10XWS on farmland owners are more
difficult to gauge. If the taxes were applied mainly
to new farmers, existing farmers would realize a
competitive advantage. If applied equally to all
farms, existing farmland owners would be hurt by
the taxes themselves but helped by the increase in
demand for farmland that reductions in chemical
input use would cause. Simulations indicate that
the former effect would substantially outweigh the
latter (Gardner).
The effect of each economic incentive on fed-
eral, state, and/or local government budgets is fairly
clear, Taxes would raise morjey that could be spent
on other programs and would be suppmted by groups
with no direct stake in water quality protection on
that basis. Subsidies could involve potentially huge
expenditures, depending on the desired level of
water quality, which argues against their political
viability. Conservation compliance reduces federal
outlays on the farm commodity programs by dis-
couraging program participation.
Research and Development
Another option is to promote public and private
research for alternative production practices. This
approach has been implemented most notably by
recent funding of LISA (low-input sustainable ag-
riculture) research intended in part to reduce chem-
ical use on farms. The 1990 Farm Bill authorizes
$40 million for LISA research, although this is less
than 4 percent of the bill’s total annual agricultural
research authorization. Encouraging private re-
search is also a possibility and has been the objec-
tive of some aspects of tax policy, such as tax
credits based on qualifying expenditures in other
contexts.
There have been some genuine successes in cut-
ting pesticide use on cotton through integrated pest
management. However, cutting chemical use on
other crops through alternativetechniqueshas proven
much harder. It is generally accepted that research
and development has not yet yielded any practical,
large-scale substitutes for agricultural chemicals.
There are many possibilities (National Research
Council), but developing them will take a long
time. For example, nitrogen-fixating cereal vari-
eties are years, if not decades, away.
The political viability of research and develop-
ment is hard to determine. The existence of modest
LISA funding implies that there is at least some
political viability. Politicians are always attracted
by the idea of a “technological fix” that leaves
everyone better off. However, since technological
solutions for water quality problems are years away,
politicians concerned with short-run outcomes will
not rely exclusively on research and development.
The political viability of a large-scale research and
development program must be rated as poor, but
the prospects for a moderate expansion of the LISA
program are fair to good.
Summary and Conclusions
Economic and political evaluations are summarized
in Table 1 for selected policy options. The focus
is on key options for modifying farm decision mak-
ing, and hence the options listed are by no means
exhaustive. The rankings are the authors’ subjec-
tive assessments of the potential performance of
the selected options with respect to the criteria.
The actual performance of any given measure would
depend on details of its implementation and on the
economic and political environment in which it was
enacted and administered.
The potential effectiveness criterion in Table 1
was not introduced explicitly in the foregoing dis-60 April 1991 NJARE
cussion but was implicit. This criterion refers to
the potential of the policy option to have a signif-
icant impact on chemical loss from farms. For rea-
sons previously discussed, we rank both moral
suasion and research and development poor with
respect to this criterion. However, we must note
that there are some who would disagree, especially
those who support “alternative agriculture” as an
economically viable alternative to conventional
production systems without regulatory or economic
intervention. Other policies were assumed to be of
equal effectiveness. Of course, disagreement may
exist with respect to other rankings as well.
It is evident that no policy dominates the others
with respect to all criteria. An overall ranking would
therefore require weights on the items. In practice,
the political criteria (potential effectiveness, ad-
ministration and enforcement costs, budgetary im-
pacts, farmland owner impacts) are likely to be
given greater weight than the economic criteria.
This is not inappropriate since little or nothing may
be accomplished otherwise. However, it is in the
society’s interest to take the economic criteria into
consideration so as to avoid policies that waste
resources by imposing unnecessarily high costs of
control.
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